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EXONERATION AND WRONGFUL 
CONDEMNATIONS: 
EXPANDING THE ZONE OF 




Dramatic exonerations of death-sentenced and other pris-
oners have had a significant impact on the public's view of our 
criminal justice system. For many citizens, an aura of infalli-
bility has been shattered. This, in turn, has certainly affected 
their views on capital punishment,l and helps to account for 
modestly but consistently declining death penalty support over 
the last decade or more.2 In particular, the previously wide-
* Professor of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz; B.A., University 
of Pennsylvania; M.A., Stanford University; Ph.D., Stanford University; J.D. Stanford 
Law School. 
1 A number of studies have established a relationship between skepticism about 
the fairness and reliability of the system of capital punishment and support for a mora-
torium on death sentencing. See, e.g., Scott Vollum, Dennis Longmire, & Jacqueline 
Buffington-Vollum, Confidence in the Death Penalty and Support for Its Use: Exploring 
the Value-Expressive Dimension of Death Penalty Attitudes, 21 JUSTICE Q. 521 (2004). 
2 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Second Thoughts: Ameri-
cans' Views on the Death Penalty at the Turn of the Century, in BEYOND REPAIR: 
AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 7, 16 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003); James Liebman, The 
New Death Penalty Debate What's DNA Got to Do With It?, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 527, 534 (2002). Various news reports have carried the same message of declining 
death penalty support in recent years. See, e.g., Thomas Healy, Death Penalty Support 
Drops as Debate Shifts; Foes Turning Focus from Moral Issues to Flaws in the System, 
131 
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spread and largely unchallenged assertion that capital cases 
were routinely handled with such care that mistakes rarely, if 
ever, occurred has been placed in doubt. 3 Moreover, the mis-
carriages of justice that have given rise to these new-found 
concerns are fundamental and dramatic, involving persons who 
literally did not commit the crimes in question but were held 
accountable for them nonetheless.4 
In addition, there have been many more of these errors 
than most laypersons (or scholars) had predicted or believed 
possible. For example, in one often-cited turn of events, it was 
reported that the state of Illinois removed more wrongfully 
convicted people from its death row than were added as a re-
sult of new death sentences. 5 The fact that the miscarriages in 
question were so fundamental yet so numerous suggests that 
the underlying causes are systemic in nature, rather than the 
result of mere inadvertence or occasional human error. The 
exonerations of wrongfully convicted, factually innocent per-
sons have spurred calls for moratoria on the imposition of capi-
tal punishment, at least until fundamental reforms can be in-
troduced into the system by which the death penalty is 
administered. 6 
In this article I argue that despite the very serious nature 
and surprisingly large number of these kinds of exonerations, 
BALTIMORE SUN, July 25, 2001, at AI. 
3 As two commentators put it, before the "innocence revolution" began in the 
early 1990s, "we, as a society, believed our criminal justice system was highly accurate. 
We believed that those caught and executed were guilty, and that the innocent were 
never executed or even charged, protected by a system that rarely, if ever, made mis· 
takes." Mark Godsey & Thomas Pulley, The Innocence Revolution and Our "Evolving 
Standards of Decency" in Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 265, 265· 
66 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
4 Carol Steiker and Gordon Steiker term these kinds of exonerations as involv-
ing "pure" innocence. They note that, although some exonerated persons were "not 
wholly blameless," it is the cases of pure innocence, "with DNA exonerations serving as 
the paradigm of 'erroneous' convictions," that have "captured popular and political at-
tention." Carol Steiker & Jordon Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: That Attraction 
and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587,598 (2005) [hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, The Se-
duction of Innocence]. 
5 See Rob Warden, fllinois Death Penalty Reform: How It Happened, What It 
Promises, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 382 (2005). 
6 As two knowledgeable commentators put it, "[t]he driving concern is the risk 
of death-sentencing and executing innocents. This issue emerged as lawyers and jour-
nalists brought to light numerous instances of innocents erroneously sentenced to 
death." Steiker & Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence, supra note 4, at 594. 
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revelations about factually innocent death-sentenced prisoners 
represent only the most dramatic, visible tip of a much larger 
problem that is submerged throughout our nation's system of 
death sentencing. That is, many of the very same flaws and 
factors that have given rise to these highly publicized wrongful 
convictions also produce a more common kind of miscarriage of 
justice in capital cases. I refer to death sentences that are 
meted out to defendants who, although they may be factually 
guilty of the crimes for which they were placed on trial, are not 
"death worthy" or "deserving" of the death penalty. This in-
cludes the many who, if their cases had been handled properly 
by competent counsel at the time of trial and adjudicated in a 
fairer and more just system, would have been sentenced to life 
instead. 
This more common kind of miscarriage of justice has re-
sulted in, to use James Liebman's evocative phrase, "the over-
production of death."7 Liebman has argued that "[t]rial-Ievel 
actors drastically overproduce death sentences," rendering 
many more times the number of death verdicts than "the sys-
tem means to carry out," and that they do so because of the 
"strong incentives" they reap in the form of the "robust psychic, 
political, and professional rewards."8 In addition to these in-
centives and rewards, I argue that there are other aspects of 
the system of death sentencing that consistently bias and badly 
distort the outcome of capital cases. Beyond the flaws and bi-
ases that produce the wrongful convictions (or what might be 
called "the overproduction of guilt") there are a number of ad-
ditional problems, many of which are unique to death penalty 
cases, that undermine the fairness and reliability of the process 
of death sentencing itself. 
In this regard, I should emphasize that there is no inher-
ent or necessary tension between the "exoneration movement" 
and more comprehensive efforts at reforming or eliminating 
the system of capital punishment. That is, I do not believe that 
what Carol and Jordon Steiker have called "the seduction of 
innocence" necessarily diverts attention from the many other 
flaws in the system of death sentencing.9 Indeed, despite the 
7 James Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2033 
(2000). 
8Id. at 2032. 
9 See Steiker & Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence, supra note 4. 
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surprisingly high number of exonerations, it is also still true 
that most people who are tried for death penalty crimes are fac-
tually guilty. But this concession is no cause for celebration or 
self-congratulation about the quality of justice or the quantity 
of due process that is routinely dispensed in capital cases. 10 
The forces that produce miscarriages of justice in guilt deter-
minations still too often combine with other biasing influences 
to compromise and undermine the quality of many other 
equally important decisions that are made in death penalty 
cases, raising profound questions about the fairness and reli-
ability of the ultimate outcomes. 
Thus, many aspects of our flawed system of capital pun-
ishment not only increase faulty guilt determinations but also 
can result in defendants being convicted of a higher degree of 
homicide than is justified by the actual facts of the case and 
operate to facilitate death sentences when life is the legally and 
morally correct verdict. Elsewhere I have termed this "death 
by design"-the special social psychological design of our sys-
tem of death sentencing that enables ordinary citizens to en-
gage in behavior that, under normal circumstances, many of 
them would be unable to do-namely, to take the life of another 
person.l1 In fact, I have suggested that without the elaborate, 
legally-supported network of practices and procedures that fa-
cilitate people overcoming their deep-seated psychological bar-
riers against doing the "deed of capital punishment,"12 the 
death penalty might well fall into disuse in our society. That 
is, it is possible that too few normal, average persons would be 
capable of regularly (and sometimes enthusiastically) calling 
for the death of their fellow citizens, let alone, as jurors, taking 
steps designed to bring those deaths about. 
Our system of death sentencing has come to rely on the 
practices and procedures that help people overcome deep-
seated psychological barriers against killing. They lower the 
threshold that is required for conviction, for conviction of 
death-eligible crimes, and for condemning someone to death. 
Collectively, these practices and procedures are built into the 
very system of death sentencing; they are part of its normative 
10 See e.g., Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 501 (2005). 
11 CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM (Oxford University Press 2005). 
12 Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601, 1613 (1986). 
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mode of operation. They certainly help to account for some of 
the wrongful convictions that have shaken the system so pro-
foundly in recent years, but they also contribute to the wrong-
ful death sentences that are still often overlooked. As I will 
suggest in the final section of this article, because these aspects 
of the system operate cumulatively and in tandem, they pose a 
set of inter-related problems that must be solved in a compre-
hensive rather than piecemeal fashion. 
I. BROADENING THE CATEGORY OF "EXONERATION": 
ERRONEOUS DETERMINATIONS OF FACTUAL, LEGAL, AND 
"MORAL" GUILT 
In thinking about the nature of "exoneration" in the con-
text of death penalty cases, it is useful to parse the concept of 
"guilt" into three separate components. I3 First, there is the 
most basic kind of guilt, and what most laypersons think about 
when they consider whether an accused is "guilty" of a criminal 
offense. It is what might be called "factual guilt." In the classic 
definition of the elements of a crime, this is the actus reus, the 
physical or behavioral component of the criminal act. It re-
quires the factfinder to address the threshold question that 
must be answered before legal responsibility can be ascribed: is 
this the person who carried out the physical acts that are de-
fined as criminal? 
The exonerations that have garnered so much media and 
legal attention in recent years have been ones in which this ba-
sic kind of factual guilt was placed at issue. In each case, the 
criminal justice system arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and 
sentenced (sometimes to death) persons who were factually in-
nocent of the crimes of which they had been accused. That is, 
they were the "wrong" people, in the most basic and fundamen-
tal sense. The overwhelming majority of them had nothing 
whatsoever to do with the acts or behaviors that resulted in 
criminal harm-they were nowhere near the crime, knew noth-
ing about it and yet, somehow, they were convicted and sen-
13 The fiTst two components reflect the traditional elements of a crime. Thus, 
"[i]n the vernacular of the common law, these requirements correspond, roughly speak· 
ing, to the traditional elements of actus reus and mens rea, the physical and mental 
aspects of a crime, respectively." Samuel Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral 
Justification of Executive Clemency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 12·13 (2005). See also 
WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw 239 (4th ed. 2000). 
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tenced for having committed it. 
Even though factual guilt is what most laypersons mean 
when they talk about whether someone is guilty-or in the case 
of miscarriages of justice and subsequent exonerations, 
whether an "innocent" person has been wrongly convicted-
law-trained persons know that, for the great majority of crimes, 
there is another important element of a crime that must be 
proven before someone can be held legally responsible. Thus, 
mens rea pertains to the state of mind of the defendant just be-
fore and often during the act in question.14 Except for strict li-
ability crimes, criminal defendants must have general intent-
essentially, be conscious and sane-at the time the crime was 
committed.15 In addition, for most offenses, there are other as-
pects of the perpetrator's state of mind in the form of various 
specific intents that determine the degree of the crime for 
which he or she can be convicted. 
Mens rea is hardly a secondary matter in establishing 
criminal responsibility or what might be called "legal guilt." 
This is especially true in homicide cases where the issue of 
what the defendant was thinking in the course of the crime of-
ten garners more legal attention than any other. Under the 
law of homicide in California, for example, mental states like 
"intent to kill," "malice aforethought," and "premeditation and 
deliberation" distinguish manslaughter from murder, and sec-
ond- and first-degree murder from one another.16 Depending 
on what a jury decides a homicide defendant was thinking just 
before and during the time he performed the criminal act-in 
14 Martin Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in 
the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 636 (1993) [hereinafter 
Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma] ("Early in the English legal tradition, the idea arose 
that criminal liability entails some mental activity on the part of the offender relating 
to the proscribed conduct."). I do not mean to suggest that there is anything straight-
forward or uncomplicated about the definition of mens rea or the application of the con-
cept to actual fact patterns. See, e.g., Jeremy Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The Con-
science or Consciousness of the Criminal Law?, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 21 (2001). 
15 Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma, supra note 14, at 667. 
16 See, e.g., Charles Hobson, Reforming California's Homicide Law, 23 PEPP. L. 
REV. 495, 504-05 (1996). More generally, see the classic article Herbert Wechsler & 
Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1261 (1937). 
Other statutes employ different mental states to grade the degrees of homicide. For 
example, the Model Penal Code relies on purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negli-
gence. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02. For a discussion, see Alan Michaels, "Rationales" of 
Criminal Law Then and Now: For a Judgmental Descriptivism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 54 
(2000). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 187-89 (West 2006). 
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this case, the unlawful taking of a human life-he or she may 
end up serving a term of years in prison, receive a sentence of 
life without the possibility of parole, or become eligible for the 
death penalty. 
Finally, there is a separate guilt-related issue that has 
special significance in death penalty cases. It poses the ques-
tion of what might be called "moral guilt": how blameworthy is 
the person for the actions in question? Blameworthiness or 
culpability is a key determinant of the amount or level of pun-
ishment a wrongdoer is thought to deserve. Professors Eliza-
beth Scott and Laurence Steinberg are correct to suggest that 
"[c]alibrated measures of culpability are embedded in the 
criminal law, particularly in mens rea doctrine and the law of 
homicide."17 Yet there is more to assessing culpability than 
merely establishing the degree of the crime. 18 For this reason, 
the issue of moral guilt-to the extent that it is considered ex-
plicitly at all-tends to surface in sentencing proceedings. It 
arises when decisions are made about the precise amount of 
punishment that should be meted out to an otherwise factually 
and legally guilty defendant. 19 
17 Elizabeth Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 
827 (2003). 
18 Phyllis Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness: Differentiating 
Between Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 21, 36-37 
(1997). Although she believes the approach is problematic, Professor Phyllis Crocker 
noted that the United States Supreme Court's theory of culpability in capital cases em-
ploys a distinction akin to the one I have made between legal and moral guilt. That is, 
the Court acknowledges the two very different kinds of inquiries in which capital jurors 
must engage: 
At times the Court seems to differentiate between the two by casting the pun-
ishment phase determination as one about the defendant's moral culpability, as 
opposed to his purely legal culpability at the guilt phase. In this respect, a de-
fendant's moral culpability for murder may be greater or lesser, depending on 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, even though his legal culpability re-
mains the same. Id. (footnote omitted) 
To avoid confusion over the similarity in terms, especially the incorrect inference that 
once someone has been found legally responsible for a death penalty crime, he auto-
matically "deserves" the death penalty, Professor Crocker proposes to substitute the 
term "deathworthiness" for "moral culpability." Id. at 22. 
19 An example of this distinction appears in the opening paragraph of Justice 
Stevens's Atkins opinion, where he notes that although mentally retarded persons "who 
meet the law's requirements for criminal responsibility should be tried and punished 
when they commit crimes," the disabilities from which they suffer (particularly with 
respect to reasoning, judgment, and impulse control) mean that they cannot "act with 
the level of moral culpability" required to be eligible the death penalty. Atkins v. Vir-
ginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002). In addition to mental retardation, the youthfulness of 
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Sentencing proceedings are the very centerpiece of many 
death penalty cases. They are often the most elaborately pre-
pared and intensely contested stage of the trial. As Ronald Ta-
bak put it, "in most capital punishment cases, the main battle 
occurs during the penalty phase, not the guilt/innocence 
phase."2o This may be in part because there often appear to be 
so few doubts about whether the defendant is factually or le-
gally guilty at the outset of many capital cases (although, to be 
sure, the exoneration movement has given pause to death pen-
alty lawyers, cautioning them against taking anything for 
granted, including in cases where the guilt phase issues seem 
"open and shut"). However, after a capital defendant has been 
found legally responsible for the criminal act or acts for which 
he or she is being tried, capital jurors still must render a pro-
foundly important second verdict, choosing between a sentence 
of life or death. Not only are the stakes extraordinarily high 
but the law has significantly broadened the nature of the in-
quiry in which they must engage. Thus, jurors are supposed to 
look beyond a single act and consider blameworthiness or 
moral guilt over an entire life course. They are invited to ask, 
in essence, what kind of person is this? 
The increased legal emphasis on the separate determina-
tion of moral guilt or blameworthiness in capital cases began 
some thirty years ago. When the U.S. Supreme Court rein-
stated the death penalty in 1976,2I it made the individualized 
determination of the "death worthiness" of capital defendants 
the hallmark constitutional death sentencing. For example, in 
Woodson u. North Carolina,22 the Court invalidated that state's 
death penalty statute because it created a system of mandatory 
death sentencing that did not include a separate inquiry into 
the overall culpability of the defendant. Instead, to decide 
whether death is the appropriate punishment, the Court ;re-
quired an inquiry that went beyond simply determining 
the defendant also categorically precludes death penalty imposition. Roper v. Sim· 
mons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). Otherwise, the question of moral guilt or overall cul-
pability is decided by capital jurors on a case-by-case basis. 
20 Ronald Tabak, The Egregiously Unfair Implementation of Capital Punishment 
in the United States: "Super Due Process" or Super Lack of Due Process?, 147 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 13, 22 (2003). 
21 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
22 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
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whether the defendant was factually and legally guilty.23 
Indeed, Justice Stewart's opinion in Woodson underscored 
the importance of a "[p]articularized consideration of relevant 
aspects of the character and record of the convicted defen-
dant."24 This separate assessment should include, as Stewart 
put it, consideration of the "compassionate or mitigating factors 
stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind."25 The im-
portance of this unique determination was reiterated and em-
phasized in a line of cases that began two terms later in Lockett 
v. Ohio26 and has continued to the present.27 Justice O'Connor 
articulated the core purpose of this "individualized assessment 
of the appropriateness of the death penalty" as one requiring 
capital juries to engage in a "moral inquiry into the culpability 
of the defendant."28 
Determinations of each one of the different types of guilt I 
have described-factual, legal, and moral-can produce its own 
kind of miscarriage of justice (and, by implication, its own form 
of exoneration). As I noted earlier, most of the high profile ex-
onerations that have heightened public and political concerns 
involved the erroneous determination of factual guilt-cases in 
which the police arrested and the prosecutors convicted the 
"wrong" person. Because the person who actually committed 
the crime must be in custody before justice can begin to be 
done, factual guilt determinations involve a very basic thresh-
old issue. Not surprisingly, these miscarriages are the ones 
that garner the most attention and create the most fundamen-
tal doubts about the fairness and reliability of the criminal jus-
tice system. 
The other obvious reason that these kinds of exonerations 
have provoked so much legal, political, and public debate is 
that they are subject to more objective, definitive forms of proof 
(and disproof). That is, factual guilt determinations are bound, 
23Id. at 303-04. 
24 Id. at 303. 
25Id. at 304. See also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion) (emphasizing that "[w]hat is essential is that the jury have before it all possible 
information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine.") (emphasis 
added). 
26 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
27 See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); see also Eddings v. Okla-
homa, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
28 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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at least to some degree, by the physical laws of nature. In ad-
dition, increasingly sophisticated forensic technologies (espe-
cially DNA testing) now can definitively rule out potential per-
petrators. Thus, in the case of such an exoneration, not only is 
the nature of the erroneous factual guilt determination a basic 
one, but the demonstration of error, because of the physical 
principles on which it is based, is usually decisive and beyond 
dispute.29 However much they help to insure correct determi-
nations of factual guilt (and in identifying those cases in which 
incorrect determinations were made), few if any of these defini-
tive, objective techniques are available to assist in the evalua-
tion of what I have termed legal and moral guilt. In the case of 
legal guilt, decisions about state of mind involve inherently 
subjective assessments. Indeed, an assessment of what some-
one was or might have been thinking at a particular point in 
time is the very epitome of subjectivity. It is not, therefore, 
susceptible to the same kind of clear-cut, objective disproof. 
Similarly, few if any judgments about the overall culpabil-
ity of an otherwise factually guilty person can be made on the 
basis of a single, definitive scientific test. 30 Indeed, the amount 
of imprecision and equivocality is greatest for assessments of 
moral guilt, not because such judgments are necessarily more 
subjective than in the case of mens rea, but rather because so 
many potential issues can be brought to bear on the decision. 
This is especially true for blameworthiness in a capital case, 
where a defendant's entire life course is placed at issue. Thus, 
not only are the standards to be considered by the jury in de-
termining whether to impose death sentence ''by necessity, 
somewhat general,"31 but the factors that can be taken into ac-
29 As Innocence Project Director Barry Scheck put it, DNA testing has given us 
"a remarkable data set that's never existed before in the history of our criminal justice 
system where you can say these people are stone cold innocent. We can't argue about 
it." Barry Scheck, Call to Action: A Moratorium on Executions, 4 N. Y. CITY L. REV. 
117, 171 (2002). Of course, not all exonerations of factually innocent persons involve 
DNA or such clear-cut, scientific demonstrations of error. 
30 I suppose that one limited exception to this generalization might occur in the 
case of mental retardation. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), as I noted ear· 
lier, the Court decided that mentally retarded defendants were not eligible for the 
death penalty because they lacked the requisite moral culpability. The determination 
of whether a defendant is mentally retarded turns in large part on the results of scien-
tific tests. However, even here, intelligence and related tests, and their implications 
for the ultimate legal question, are somewhat more open to interpretation than the 
DNA and other testing relied upon in many of the factual guilt exonerations. 
31 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193·94 (1976). The Model Penal Code, which 
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count also are so many and varied.32 
However, simply because determinations of legal and 
moral guilt are not subject to objective and definitive disproof 
does not mean that the decisions cannot be demonstrably in-
correct, or serve as the basis for egregious miscarriages of jus-
tice, or provide an occasion for their own kind of exoneration. 
In fact, because judgments made about states of mind (in the 
case of legal guilt) and attributions of blameworthiness for a 
single act or entire life course (in the case of moral guilt) are 
inherently subjective, they are much more susceptible to the 
psychological pressures and influences that may compromise 
their fairness and reliability. 
In the broadest sense, then, the case of an erroneous death 
sentence occurs whenever a person is sentenced to die who, if 
he had been subjected to a fairer and less biased legal system 
and decision-making process, would have been sentenced to life 
instead. These cases are ones in which capital defendants, al-
though they have not been "wrongly convicted," have been 
"wrongfully condemned." The legally unique and unusually 
broad-based nature of the capital penalty-phase inquiry in 
which these decisions are made renders it especially vulnerable 
to these kinds of miscarriages of justice. 
II. A FLAWED, "ERROR-PRONE" SYSTEM OF DEATH 
SENTENCING 
Samuel Gross and others have argued persuasively that 
erroneous determinations of factual guilt may be more likely to 
occur in capital cases than in other kinds, a surprising claim 
given the longstanding and widespread contention that death 
is different and that death penalty cases are typically handled 
served as the basis for many of the new death penalty statutes that the Court approved 
in 1976, listed eight aggravating and eight mitigating circumstances. See MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). On the other hand, the Georgia 
statute that the Court approved in Gregg specified ten aggravating circumstances but 
no mitigating circumstances. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 166. Even so, Justice Stewart sug-
gested that a capital defendant in Georgia was "accorded substantial latitude as to the 
types of evidence that he may introduce." [d. at 164. 
32 See Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and 
the Logic of Capital Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547 (1995) [hereinafter Haney, 
The Social Context of Capital Murder] (discussing some of these many and varied fac-
tors). 
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differently, and much better, than other cases.33 Yet, as Gross 
has noted, there are many factors at work in capital cases that 
increase the probability of a wrongful conviction. These factors 
impinge on murder cases in general to distort and undermine 
the normal fact-finding process, and they operate with even 
more effect in those murder cases that are death-eligible. They 
include such things as the added pressure on the police and 
prosecutors to solve high visibility homicides, the way that 
pressure affects how these officials investigate and process the 
case, and the heightened stakes in murder cases that may pro-
duce unreliable witness and jailhouse "snitch" testimony.34 
However, beyond the astute categorization of the factors 
that generate miscarriages of justice at the level of factual guilt 
that Gross and other scholars have made,35 the zone of per-
ceived injustice in capital cases can be broadened to include the 
influence and impact of factors that contribute to erroneous de-
terminations of legal guilt and, to an even greater extent, what 
I have termed moral guilt.36 Expanding this zone of perceived 
injustice would entail giving much greater attention to miscar-
riages of justice in which people are convicted of higher degrees 
of crime than are warranted by the facts and, more broadly, 
those who receive death sentences in part as a result of the 
strong "death tilt" that is built into the design of our system of 
death sentencing. Below I discuss several categories of factors 
33 Samuel Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in 
Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469 (1996) [hereinafter Gross]. Like most scholars who 
address this issue, Professor Gross limited his analysis to erroneous determinations of 
what I have termed "factual guilt"- specifically, "convictions of 'the wrong person'; a 
defendant who did not do the act that caused the death or deaths for which he was con-
victed." Id. at 475. 
34 Id. at 476-88. 
35 Gross, supra note 33; see also Hugo Bedau & Michael Radelet, Miscarriages of 
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987); MICHAEL RADELET, 
HUGO BEDAU & CONSTANCE PUTNAM, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS 
CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (Northeastern University Press 1992). 
36 Among the primary causes of wrongful convictions identified by scholars and 
advocates, two are especially problematic, namely, incompetent lawyers and prosecuto-
rial suppression of evidence that is favorable to the defense. Compare JIM DWYER, 
PETER NEUFELD, & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIvE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND 
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 172-92 (Doubleday 2000), with 
James Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jonathan Lloyd, Capital Attrition: Er-
ror Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1864 (2000). For reasons I 
discuss later in this article, however, I believe that what I have termed "wrongful con-
demnations" may be caused by a broader and more varied set of psychological influ-
ences. 
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that may contribute to miscarriages of justice in which capital 
defendants are wrongfully condemned. 
A. MEDIA BIAS AS A SOURCE OF WRONGFUL CONDEMNATIONS 
The media may contribute significantly to miscarriages of 
justice, especially in capital cases.37 For one, citizens, voters, 
and jurors are treated to a steady flow of misinformation about 
capital punishment. This misinformation pertains not only to 
who commits capital crime and why, but also to the way the 
system of death sentencing actually operates in our society and 
whether it has any real utility in the fight against violent 
crime. The inaccuracies are not random, but rather slanted in 
such a way as to favor death sentences over life. In fact, much 
social science research indicates that the widespread dissemi-
nation of misinformation has produced basic misconceptions 
about the death penalty held by many members of the public.38 
Researchers also have found that support for the death penalty 
is directly related to those misconceptions. That is, the more 
persons endorse inaccurate beliefs about the death penalty, the 
more likely they are to favor it.39 
As a result, many members of the public are left with only 
flawed and incomplete knowledge with which to reason and de-
cide about whether and when capital punishment is justified. 
In the final analysis, this may result in some persons being 
sentenced to death who, if the public were more fully and accu-
rately informed, would be sentenced to life instead.40 A juror 
37 I am aware that, especially in recent years, the media also have played an im-
portant role in publicizing and even helping to uncover miscarriages of justice. But I 
believe that these cases still represent notable exceptions rather than the rule. More-
over, the media still often focus only on the fact that a miscarriage of justice has oc-
curred, without including any overall analysis of its causes (and certainly not ones that 
might implicate the media themselves). The public is often left with the impression 
that such miscarriages are infrequent and, while certainly regrettable, are the product 
of human error or caprice rather than structural flaws in the criminal justice system 
itself. 
38 See James Fox, Michael Radelet & Julie Bonsteel, Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Years, 18 N. Y. U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 499 (1990-1991); Craig Haney, Aida 
Hurtado & Luis Vega, "Modern" Death Qualification: New Data on Its Biasing Effects, 
18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 619 (1994) [hereinafter Haney, Hurtado & Vega]. 
39 See HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN supra note 11, at Chapter 4. 
40 See, e.g., Timothy J. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire, Americans' Attitudes 
About the Ultimate Weapon: Capital Punishment, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND 
JUSTICE: A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 93-108 (Timothy Flanagan & D. Long-
mire eds., 1996). 
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whom the media have convinced that the death penalty should 
be imposed because it deters murder or will cost the state less 
money than life imprisonment, or who believes that the system 
of capital punishment is free of the taint of racial bias and is 
administered so carefully that innocent persons are virtually 
never sentenced to death, is not only misinformed but is some-
one who is poised to render an erroneous death verdict. Cases 
of capital defendants who have been wrongfully condemned be-
cause their death sentences were based in large part on media-
based myth and misconception represent serious but typically 
overlooked miscarriages of justice. 
The media also playa direct role in helping to shape the 
way people think about crime and the people who commit it. 
Studies of the impact of media coverage of crime-related topics 
bear this out. According to at least one survey, the media were 
the most important source of information about the crime prob-
lem for ninety percent of the respondents.41 Many researchers 
also have observed that the media focus so often and exten-
sively on crime that they distort and exaggerate its prevalence 
and significance. The media's obsession with crime may pro-
duce inflated or unjustified crime-related fears that lead mem-
bers of the public to demand harsh punishments, including the 
death penalty.42 
The media not only help to create and maintain people's 
general beliefs about crime and punishment but also shape 
their views of criminal defendants. There is a consistent slant 
to the perspective that is conveyed. For example, John Sloop 
analyzed the way the media portrayed the perpetrators of 
crime over the more than forty-year period from 1950-1993.43 
He found evidence of a dramatic shift away from depicting 
them as redeemable or subject to personal growth and change. 
Instead, there was a growing tendency to show prisoners as ir-
41 RICHARD SURRETTE, MEDIA, CRIME & CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMAGES AND 
REALITIES 58 (Wadsworth 1992). 
42 See, e.g., Melissa Barlow, David Barlow & Theodore Chiricos, Mobilizing Sup· 
port for Social Control in a Declining Economy: Exploring Ideologies of Crime Within 
Crime News, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 191 (1995); Jason Ditton & James Duffy, Bias in the 
Reporting of Crime News, 23 BRITISH J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 159 (1983); S. Gorelick, "Join 
Our War':· The Construction of Ideology in a Newspaper Crimefighting Campaign, 35 
CRIME & DELINQ. 421 (1989); Edie Greene, Media Effects on Jurors, 14 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 439 (1990). 
43 JOHN SLOOP, THE CULTURAL PRISON: DISCOURSE, PRISONERS, AND 
PUNISHMENT (University of Alabama Press 1996). 
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rational, predatory, dangerous, and incapable of being re-
formed. Violent criminals in particular were depicted as "ani-
malistic and senseless," governed by their "warped personali-
ties."44 
This media stereotype of the "typical" criminal may exac-
erbate pre-existing tendencies to attribute deviant behavior ex-
clusively to negative traits, malevolent thoughts, and bad 
moral character. Indeed, as one legal commentator has ob-
served, demonizing the perpetrators of crime in these ways 
helps to simplify the difficult task of assigning moral blame 
and to "condemn beyond what is deserved," the paradigmatic 
case of a wrongful condemnation.45 To be sure, persons per-
ceived as fundamentally different from us are easier to hurt 
and, in an ultimate sense, to condemn to death. When the me-
dia exaggerate and essentialize apparent differences between 
criminal defendants and the rest of society, they increase the 
temptation "to ignore moral complexities [inherent in the proc-
ess of judging another] and declare the person and his act en-
tirely evil."46 Too often, the media encourage us to "assign the 
offender the mythic role of Monster, a move which justifies 
harsh treatment and insulates us from moral concerns about 
the suffering we inflict."47 
Moreover, as I have emphasized, deciding whether to im-
pose the death penalty is a normative, value-laden process. 
Unlike the determination of factual guilt, it is not anchored in 
the physical universe. Thus, the judgment about whether 
someone deserves death is especially vulnerable to these bias-
ing psychological influences, which, in turn, increases the fre-
quency with which miscarriages of justice occur. 
In addition to the demonizing of criminals as part of a gen-
eral framework for understanding crime-and-punishment is-
sues, the media can create many case-specific biases. Because 
death penalty cases involve serious violent crimes, they gener-
44Id. at 142. 
45 Samuel Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal 
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 692 (1989) [hereinafter Pillsbury]. 
46Id. 
47 See Pillsbury, supra note 45, at 692; KATHRYN GAUBATZ, CRIME IN THE PUBLIC 
MIND 163 (University of Michigan Press 1995) (arguing that the punitive consensus 
that came to dominate public attitudes towards crime and punishment by the mid· 
1990s could be explained in large part by an inability to empathize or to perceive com-
monalities with persons who had committed crimes and to view them instead as having 
moved "beyond the pale.") 
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ate high levels of community interest and heightened attention 
from the local media and law enforcement officials. Commen-
tators have cited the fact that capital cases often involve "high 
profile crimes that attract enormous media attention" as one of 
the important factors that contributes to "high error rates in 
convicting and sentencing innocent people to death row."48 
The publicity that surrounds a particular death penalty 
case puts enormous pressure on the police to find a culprit and 
on prosecutors to gain a conviction and death sentence. As one 
prosecutor acknowledged, "[t]he pressure on the District Attor-
ney is particularly great in a high profile case, a homicide or 
multiple homicide so grievous and so aggravated that there is a 
hue and cry and a determination to pursue capital punish-
ment."49 Certain kinds of cases "can fever a community, large 
or small, particularly if there's agitated press about it."50 
But there are various additional ways that the media can 
contribute to the erroneous attribution of legal and moral guilt. 
Indeed, local news coverage of specific capital cases typically is 
slanted in such a way that it compounds pre-existing, general 
biases held by community residents. Much research indicates 
that exposure to prejudicial pretrial publicity increases the 
guilt-proneness of potential jurors, especially when specific 
items of publicity are absorbed in memory. 51 In cases where 
the media has decided that a particular defendant is guilty, 
community members who have few if any other sources of in-
formation about the case, often come to share this view.52 This 
48 Alan W. Clarke et al., Executing the Innocent: The Next Step in the Marshall 
Hypothesis, 26 N. Y. U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 309, 345 (2000-2001). 
49 Michael McCann, Call to Action: A Moratorium on Executions, 4 N. Y. CITY L. 
REV. 117, 160-161 (2002). 
50Id. McCann went on to acknowledge that "[tJhe handling of a high profile 
capital punishment case resulting in a conviction and the execution of the defendant 
appears, at least to some prosecutors, as an attractive way to advance their political 
interests." Id. at 161. 
51 See, e.g., E. Constanti & J. King, The Partial Juror: Correlates and Causes of 
Prejudgment, 15 LAw AND SOC'y REV_ 9 (1980); Craig Haney & H. Fukurai, Indifferent 
as They Stand Unsworn?: Pretrial Publicity, Fairness, and the Capital Jury, (2006) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); N. Steblay et aI., The Effects of Pretrial 
Publicity on Juror Verdicts: A Meta-Analytic Review, 23 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 219 
(1999); Christina Studebaker & Steven Penrod, Pretrial Publicity: The Media, Law, 
and Commonsense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUR POL'y & L. 428 (1997). 
52 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 33 at 494. Jurors in highly publicized cases "may 
have seen or heard or read police officers or other government officials declare the de-
fendant guilty. They may have witnessed or felt a general sense of communal outrage. 
All this will make them more likely to convict. _ . . As a result, the records of erroneous 
16
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is another way in which prejudicial or inflammatory publicity 
contributes to factually innocent persons being convicted of 
crimes they did not commit. 
In addition, however, news reporting can bias the judg-
ments that people make about a defendant's evil intent or 
blameworthy state of mind, as well as his moral guilt and over-
all culpability. For example, in a study Susan Greene and I did 
of the newspaper reporting in a large sample of capital cases, 
we found that the press focused intensely on the gruesome de-
tails of the crimes, left little doubt about who was fully respon-
sible for having committed them, and contained extremely 
negative characterizations of defendants.53 Moreover, most of 
this incriminating "information" was provided by seemingly 
credible sources-law enforcement and prosecutors.54 
The articles often repeated descriptions of defendants that 
essentialized their identity as a criminal, such as "thrill killer," 
"career criminal," "escapee," "fugitive," "inmate," or "serial date 
rapist."55 In many cases, the sensationalized details of the 
crime became the defendant's one-dimensional social identity-
a total description of his personhood-as though he had no po-
tentially humanizing life experiences outside of his criminal 
behavior. Thus, one defendant was described as having "the 
street cunning of a longtime criminal,"56 and another was re-
ported to commit crimes "for the thrill and sense of power,"57 
both in advance of their trials. 
The stories provided readers with little or no real under-
standing of the social historical and structural causes of the 
crime, and no sense of how the defendant's past experiences 
and background factors may have contributed to his behavior. 
The amount of attention given to the crime itself, and the way 
convictions include scores of cases in which publicity and public outrage clearly con-
tributed to the error .... " [d. 
53 Craig Haney & Susan Greene, Capital Constructions: Newspaper Reporting in 
Death Penalty Cases, 4 ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL'y 1, 129-50 (2004) [here-
inafter Haney & Greene]. 
54 See Haney & Greene, supra note 53; Marla Sandys & Steven M. Chermak, A 
Journey into the Unknown: Pretrial Publicity and Capital Cases, 1 COMM. L. & POL 'y 
533 (1996). 
55 See Haney & Greene, supra note 53. 
56 Street Smart Escapee Knows Tricks of Eluding Team of Pursuing Lawmen, L. 
A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1992, at B1. 
57 "Gone Bad" Cop Wanted in Killing at Grocery Store, S. F. EXAMINER, Aug. 21, 
1994, at C3. 
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its most dramatic or heinous features were so often repeated, 
were likely to evoke feelings of anger and outrage in the com-
munity. Of course, there is only one obvious target at which 
these feelings can be directed-the (necessarily) unsympathetic 
defendant. Among other things, this lack of coverage regarding 
a defendant's personal history, "serves to deny the humanity of 
the persons who commit capital murder, substituting the hei-
nousness of their crimes for the reality of their personhood."58 
Indeed, a profile of the typical capital defendant is con-
structed by the media, one in which he appears to have func-
tioned throughout his life as an otherwise fully autonomous 
agent making willfully blameworthy choices, presumably from 
a range otherwise attractive or desirable options, which have 
resulted in a pattern of incorrigible, violent criminality. The 
"media model" of violent criminality leads inexorably to the 
conclusion that each individual defendant has "freely" commit-
ted the violent act in question and, therefore, is solely respon-
sible, completely morally blameworthy, and entirely deserving 
of the sentence imposed upon him. 
Obviously, case-specific publicity that reinforces this view 
gives community residents and potential jurors a perspective 
on a particular capital defendant that favors the death penalty 
in his or her case. In addition, media coverage of capital cases 
focuses far more extensively on aggravation than mitigation. 59 
However, the omitted or under-reported information-the miti-
gating background and social histories of capital defendants-
is a major part of what capital juries are supposed to consider 
and take into account in their assessment of moral guilt or cul-
pability. In most cases it will be the only thing they can use as 
the basis for a life rather than a death sentence. In contrast, 
unlike aggravating factors with which the media typically in-
undates potential jurors, people are unlikely to encounter any 
mention or description of mitigating factors until the trial it-
self. 
58 Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder, supra note 32, at 547. 
59 See Haney & Greene, supra note 53, at 142. The disproportion is extreme. 
For example, Greene and I found that there were about 4.5 aggravating facts for every 
one mitigating fact that was reported in the newspaper stories we analyzed. The ratio 
did not vary much for cases that resulted in death (where aggravation would be ex-
pected to outweigh mitigation and therefore be covered more extensively) as opposed to 
those that resulted in life (where mitigation would be expected to outweigh aggravation 
and be more often reported). Id. 
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The one-sided media model of capital crime may help to 
explain another problematic feature of our system of death sen-
tencing that may contribute to the rendering of death rather 
than life verdicts. Although I discuss it in greater detail below, 
it is worth noting briefly here as well. The all-important capi-
tal sentencing instructions that are supposed to govern jury de-
cision-making in death penalty cases are very poorly under-
stood overall. However, research shows that the errors in 
comprehension are not evenly distributed and that the term 
"mitigation" is the most poorly understood of the core concepts 
on which jurors are supposed to rely.60 The fact that news re-
ports of capital cases omit nearly all mention of this kind of 
mitigation means that few people will enter a death penalty 
trial with a pre-existing "framework of understanding" that in-
cludes the mitigating significance of background social history 
information. Because of the one-sided crime focus of the news 
reporting, the task of even identifying such information, let 
alone understanding its relevance to determinations of blame-
worthiness and knowing how to take it into account in deciding 
on a defendant's life or death sentence, may be so foreign and 
unfamiliar that jurors are uncertain about whether and how to 
do it. The fact that the term "mitigation" is so poorly under-
stood in the capital sentencing instructions may be a reflection 
of these inter-related problems. But it underscores an addi-
tional fact: the instructions themselves cannot be relied upon to 
remedy these problems. 
B. JURy-RELATED FACTORS: IGNORING BIAS AND INCREASING 
DEATH PRONENESS 
In part because of the high levels of publicity that sur-
round them, capital cases present a special set of jury-related 
issues and problems that can contribute to capital defendants 
being wrongfully condemned. In some instances, miscarriages 
60 See, e.g., S. Diamond, Instructing on Death: Psychologists, Juries, and Judges, 
48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 423 (1993); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Con-
fusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1993); Craig Haney 
& Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A Preliminary Study of Caii-
fornia's Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 411 (1994); Craig Haney 
& Mona Lynch, Clarifying Life and Death Matters: An Analysis of Instructional Com-
prehension and Penalty Phase Arguments, 21 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 575 (1997); R. Wie-
ner et aI., Comprehensibility of Approved Jury Instructions in Capital Murder Cases, 80 
J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 455 (1995). 
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of justice are likely to occur because of the legal system's fail-
ure to address these problems. In other instances, however, 
the problems are of the system's own creation. 
As I have noted, the media rarely depict capital crimes, de-
fendants, and trials in balanced and complex ways that fully 
inform citizens and potential jurors about the range of issues 
they should consider and reflect on before deciding whether to 
sentence someone to die. The legal system itself does little to 
address this problem and actually may compound it. For ex-
ample, the law allows parties to request a change of venue 
when they believe there is a risk that the community from 
which the jury pool will be drawn has been tainted by prejudi-
cial pretrial publicity. Although the legal doctrines vary 
somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, they generally re-
quire a showing of a "reasonable likelihood" that a fair and im-
partial jury cannot be impaneled there.61 Unfortunately, de-
spite the existence of this potentially effective legal remedy for 
publicity-related pretrial bias, courts are extremely reluctant to 
change venue, even in capital cases.62 As one legal commenta-
tor correctly observed, among the possible remedies for prejudi-
cial pretrial publicity, "[c]hange of venue motions, above all 
others, are under-utilized by trial judges."63 As a result, many 
61 ''Reasonable likelihood that a fair trial cannot be had" is the standard en· 
dorsed by the American Bar Association. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Standards Relating to 
Fair Trial and Free Press § 8·3.3 (c) (1980). For two useful discussions of these issues 
see Peter D. O'Connell, Pretrial Publicity, Change of Venue, Public Opinion Polls: A 
Theory of Procedural Justice, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 169, 197 (1988), and Michael Jacob 
Whellan, What's Happened to Due Process Among the States? Pretrial Publicity and 
Motions for Change of Venue in Criminal Proceedings, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 175, 193 
(1990). 
62 Among other things, the added costs of conducting a trial away from the juris-
diction where most of the trial participants reside means that changes of venue are ex-
pensive to undertake. This is especially true in capital cases, where the length and 
complexity of the trial itself tend to be much greater. Moreover, highly publicized capi-
tal cases often are highly politicized as well, placing "elected trial judges under consid-
erable pressure not to ... change venue." Stephen Bright & Patrick Keenan, Judges 
and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in 
Capital Cases, 75 B. U. L. REV. 759, 766 (1995). Thus, in those cases where community 
sentiments run highest, precisely the ones for which changes of venue are most needed, 
the political risks, especially to elected trial judges, are greatest. [d. 
63 Joseph Mariniello, The Death Penalty and Pre-trial Publicity: Are Today's At-
tempts at Guaranteeing a Fair Trial Adequate?, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL'y 371, 376 (1994). Similarly, psychologists Michael Nietzel and Ronald Dillehay 
have noted that, despite its effectiveness, "courts are reluctant to change venue be-
cause of the expense, the inconvenience, and the tradition that justice should be admin-
istered in the coinmunity where the crime occurred." MICHAEL NIETZEL & RONALD 
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capital cases go to trial in communities that have been satu-
rated with publicity that contains extremely prejudicial charac-
terizations of defendants and damaging case-related informa-
tion. 64 
Thus, case-related publicity not only puts pressure on law 
enforcement and prosecutors to secure a conviction in ·capital 
cases but also increases the likelihood that defendants in death 
penalty cases will face jurors who harbor case-specific biases 
and prejudices against them. Denying a change of venue mo-
tion in a highly publicized capital case can heighten the 
chances of conviction and increase the likelihood that a death 
sentence will be imposed. Of course, a death sentence arrived 
at for this reason-a capital defendant sentenced to die who 
would have been given life by a jury chosen from another venue 
that was not exposed to such damaging pretrial publicity-
represents a serious miscarriage of justice. 
Jury selection or voir dire is the other legal remedy avail-
able to address pretrial bias. Unfortunately, it is of limited 
value in many highly publicized cases.65 Typical voir dire ques-
DILLEHAY, PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSULTATION IN THE COURTROOM 68 (pergamon 1986). 
64 Courtney Mullin, The Jury System in Death Penalty Cases: A Symbolic Ges-
ture, 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 142 (1980). Especially in small venues, "[t]he 
community demands justice and exerts tremendous pressure on the judge to keep the 
murder trial within its sphere of influence . . .. Since the change of venue is discre-
tionary with the judge, is costly in terms of time and money, and is not customarily 
granted, most judges opt to deny the motion .... " Id. 
65 For example, in theory, jury selection, where attorneys and judges have an 
opportunity to identify and excuse those persons who may be tainted by negative case-
related publicity, should help to insure the fair-mindedness of the jury that remains. 
In many highly publicized capital cases, however, jury selection procedures fall far 
short of realizing this potential. Among other things, research has shown that al-
though potential jurors may be cognizant of having been exposed to negative pretrial 
publicity (indeed, publicity that typically has led them to develop a prejudicial opinion 
of the defendant), they still tend to claim impartiality. G. Moran & B. L. Cutler, The 
Prejudicial Impact of Pretrial Publicity, 21 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 345-367 
(1991). Moreover, even those persons who claim not to be influenced by negative pre-
trial publicity nonetheless are more likely to convict the defendant than those exposed 
to neutral publicity. See, e.g., Norber L. Kerr et aI., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in 
Criminal Cases with Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. 
REV. 665 (1991); S. Sue et ai., Biasing Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Judicial Deci-
sions, 2 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 163 (1974); S. Sue et ai., Authoritarianism, Pretrial Publicity 
and Awareness of Bias in Simulated Jurors, 37 PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS 1299 (1975); 
W. C. Thompson et ai., Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40 J. OF 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 453 (1981). Research also indicates that despite at-
tempts to ask jurors about the influence of pretrial publicity in voir dire, those who dis-
claim any bias are still more inclined to be punitive toward the defendant. See Hedy 
Dexter et ai., A Test of Voir Dire as a Remedy for the Prejudicial Effects of Pretrial Pub-
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tions require prospective jurors to make difficult self-
assessments and subtle predictions about themselves: Can you 
be fair? Are you able to set aside whatever you may have read 
and heard about the case? Will you base your verdict entirely 
on the evidence and instructions you receive in court? Few 
people honestly know whether they are genuinely capable of 
these things, and few want to admit to being closed minded, 
unwilling to listen, or reluctant to follow orders from a judge. 
Fewer still will depict themselves as persons inclined to render 
unfair and biased verdicts.66 
Moreover, because capital cases require jurors to assess 
moral guilt as the basis for a decision about the appropriate-
ness of the death penalty, publicity-related bias is not re-
stricted to the issue on which voir dire is usually focused: 
whether someone is predisposed with respect to factual or legal 
guilt. Thus, prospective jurors who have become familiar with 
the consequences of the crime for the larger community (so that 
they feel pressure to impose the harshest punishment on the 
community's behalf), or who may know legally inadmissible de-
tails about the defendant's past life (so that they begin their 
assessment of case-related evidence with a store of negative in-
formation that might be used as extra-legal aggravation), or 
have seen or heard opinions expressed about the defendant's 
moral turpitude or unsavory character (that conform to their 
licity, 22 J. OF APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 819 (1992). Finally, studies suggest that ju-
dicial admonitions or instructions to ignore pretrial publicity generally fail to reduce its 
biasing effects. See, e.g., S. Fein et aI., Can the jury disregard that information? The 
use of suspicion to reduce the prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity and inadmissible 
testimony, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 1215 (1997); G. P. Kramer et aI., 
Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 409 
(1990); S. Sue et aI., Biasing Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Judicial Decisions, 2 J. OF 
CRIM. JUST. 163 (1974). 
66 For example, in an observation and interview study that Cathy Johnson and I 
did, we found that jurors were able to survive the voir dire process and sit on felony 
juries even though they held opinions that were at odds with basic tenets of American 
jurisprudence (such as presumption of innocence), and had been asked about these very 
things during jury selection. Cathy Johnson & Craig Haney, Felony Voir Dire: An Ex-
ploratory Study of Its Content and Effect, 18 LAw AND HUM. BEHAV. 487 (1994) [herein-
after Johnson & Haney]. Specifically, nearly half of the actual jurors in several felony 
cases said in post-trial interviews that they had not been able to "set aside" their per-
sonal opinions and beliefs even though they had agreed, during jury selection, to do so. 
Id. Another study that relied on post-trial interviews of persons who sat on criminal 
cases estimated that between one quarter to nearly one third of jurors were not candid 
and forthcoming in accurately and fully answering questions posed during the voir dire 
process. R. Seltzer et aI., Juror Honesty During the Voir Dire, 19 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 451 
(1991). 
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pre-existing stereotype about irredeemably violent and vicious 
criminals) are biased in ways that may prove literally fatal to a 
capital defendant. Even though these publicity-related biases 
can profoundly affect the judgments that capital jurors may be 
called upon to make about culpability and moral guilt, the ef-
fects are extremely difficult to uncover in the course of jury se-
lection. In any event, prospective jurors are rarely questioned 
about these things. Moreover, few people are willing and able 
to give accurate, candid answers about whether they have 
formed such complex, subtle, and deep-seated judgments. 
In fact, voir dire is conducted in capital cases in a way that 
increases rather than decreases the likelihood that flawed de-
terminations of factual, legal, and moral guilt will occur. In 
addition to the failure of voir dire to effectively reduce or elimi-
nate publicity-created biases, jury selection in death penalty 
cases suffers from a unique and serious problem that contrib-
utes to capital defendants being wrongfully convicted as well as 
wrongfully condemned. Death qualification is an anomalous 
feature of the capital trial process; it requires penalty to be dis-
cussed with jurors at the outset of the case, before any evidence 
has been presented and long before penalty is relevant. The at-
tention of prospective jurors is drawn away from the presump-
tion of innocence and onto what will happen after they have 
convicted the defendant. 
This anomaly is structural, built into the very nature of 
the capital process, and it operates to increase the likelihood 
that miscarriages of justice will occur. As one legal commenta-
tor put it, "[d]eath qualification as currently practiced tilts the 
jury first towards guilt and then towards death, both by remov-
ing too many of certain kinds of people from the pool, and by af-
fecting the expectations and perceptions of those who re-
main."67 Much has been made of the way that death 
67 Susan Rozelle, The Utility of Witt: Understanding the Language of Death 
Qualification, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 677, 699 (2002). Similarly, two social science reo 
searchers concluded: "At all stages of the trial-jury selection, determination of guilt or 
innocence, and the final judgment of whether the defendant lives or dies-death quali-
fication results in bias against the capital defendant of a nature that occurs for no 
other criminal defendant." James Luginbuhl & Kathi Middendorf, Death Penalty Be-
liefs and Jurors' Responses to Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital 
Trials, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 263, 279 (1988) [hereinafter Luginbuhl & Middendorf]. 
For an excellent overview see William Thompson, Death Qualification after Wainwright 
V. Witt and Lockhart V. McCree, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (1989). See also Craig 
Haney (Ed.), Special Issue on Death Qualification, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1984), and 
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qualification creates guilt-prone capital juries, and rightly so. 
This practice undoubtedly contributes to wrongful convictions 
in capital cases. Death-qualified juries are more likely to en-
dorse a crime control rather than due process perspective on 
criminal justice issues, so they begin a capital case tending to 
side more with the prosecution than the defense.68 They tend 
to deliberate less vigorously and effectively than more demog-
raphically and attitudinally diverse juries (i.e., the kind of jury 
that sits in other kinds of criminal cases).69 In addition, death-
qualified juries are exposed to a process that implies that the 
defendant is guilty. Research indicates that otherwise prema-
ture questions about penalty lead them to make precisely that 
inference, adding to the predisposition to convict and, in turn, 
making a wrongful conviction more likely.70 
However, death qualification also appears to increase the 
chances that juries will wrongfully attribute legal and moral 
guilt to capital defendants. For example, we know that, all 
other things being equal, death-qualified juries are less likely 
to accept the insanity defense and more likely to endorse the 
view that it is a "loophole" that allows too many guilty persons 
to go free.71 Moreover, because death-qualified jurors are more 
likely to reject mental health defenses, they may be left more 
susceptible to what I have termed the "media model" of will-
the various articles contained therein. 
68 See, e.g., Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Con-
trol: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1984) [herein-
after Fitzgerald & Ellsworth]; William Thompson et aI., Death Penalty Attitudes and 
Conviction Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 
95 (1984); Edward Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the 
Death-Qualified Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1 (1970); Edward Bronson, Does the Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors in Capital Cases 
Make the Jury More Likely to Convict? Some Evidence from California, 3 WOODROW 
WILSON J. OF LAw 11 (1980). 
69 Claudia Cowan, William Thompson & Phoebe Ellsworth, The Effects of Death 
Qualification and Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAw & 
HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984). As a meta-analysis of studies done through the late 1990s 
concluded: "The results indicate that the more a person favors the death penalty, the 
more likely that person is to vote to convict a defendant." Mike Allen et aI., Impact of 
Juror Attitudes about the Death Penalty on Juror Evaluations of Guilt and Punish-
ment: A Meta-Analysis, 22 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 715 (1998). 
70 Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of Death 
Qualification, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984); Craig Haney, Examining Death 
Qualification: Further Analysis of the Process Effect, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 133 (1984). 
71 Phoebe Ellsworth et aI., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity, 
8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 81 (1984); see also Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 68, at 43. 
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fully violent criminality.72 That is, they may be predisposed to 
attribute blameworthy states of mind to capital defendants, es-
pecially in cases where the defense presents evidence that 
mental illness or emotional disturbance has clouded the defen-
dant's judgment or impaired his ability to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of law. 
The final biasing effect that skews the verdicts rendered by 
persons eligible to sit on capital juries is an obvious one: death 
qualification facilitates death sentences by insuring that the 
only jurors allowed to decide whether a capital defendant lives 
or dies have been selected on the basis of their willingness to 
vote for death.73 Of course, a group selected on this basis is 
more likely to actually impose the death penalty than one se-
lected through non-death qualifying voir dire.74 Thus, death-
qualified jurors are more likely to favor the death penalty in 
general, and are also more likely to believe that it furthers im-
portant societal goals in a legally proper way (for example, to 
believe incorrectly that it deters murder and is administered 
fairly and reliably). 
Death-qualified jurors also weigh and evaluate penalty 
phase evidence differently. Specifically, they are more likely to 
endorse numerous aggravating factors while diminishing the 
significance of both statutory and non-statutory mitigation. 75 
72 This not only makes them more likely to attribute intent in situations where it 
may be lacking, but also, to the extent they see the defendant as having psychopathic 
rather than psychotic traits, more likely to impose the death penalty. See John Edens 
et aI., The Impact of Mental Health Evidence on Support for Capital Punishment: Are 
Defendants Labeled Psychopathic Considered More Deserving of Death?, 23 BEHAV. SCI. 
& LAw 603 (2005). 
73 Strictly speaking, since Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) was decided, 
capital jurors also are supposed to be selected on the basis of their willingness to vote 
for life. However, most commentators believe that so-called "life qualification" is not 
strictly adhered to or effectively practiced by the courts and that many "automatic 
death penalty jurors" manage to serve on capital juries. Thus: "The starkest failure of 
capital voir dire is the qualification of jurors who will automatically impose the death 
penalty ('ADP jurors') regardless of the individual circumstances of the case." John H. 
Blume et aI., Probing "Life Qualification" Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1209, 1220 (2001). 
74 This commonsense relationship has been supported in a number of studies. 
For one of the early ones, see George Stricker & George Jurow, The Relationship Be-
tween Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment and Assignment of the Death Penalty, 2 J. 
OF PSYCHIATRY & LAw 415 (1974). 
75 See Brooke Butler & Gary Moran, The Role of Death Qualification in Venire-
persons' Evaluations of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 
26 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 175 (2002); Haney, Hurtado, & Vega, supra note 38; Luginbuhl 
& Middendorf, supra note 67. 
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In addition, the process of death qualification has a direct im-
pact on the death sentencing behavior of capital jurors. Among 
other things, exposure to death qualification convinces jurors 
that the major trial participants favor capital punishment, de-
sensitizes them to the imposition of the death penalty, labels 
the case and the defendant as potentially "death-worthy" before 
any evidence has been presented, and requires the jurors to 
publicly affirm their willingness to impose the death penalty 
(which likely increases their commitment to doing precisely 
that). 76 
In each instance, capital jury decisions are being made by 
a carefully screened group of people whose demographic and 
attitudinal characteristics mean they are more in favor capital 
punishment. These same people likely have been changed by 
the process of screening in ways that lead them to impose 
death more often. Thus, death qualification makes wrongful 
condemnations more likely. These miscarriages of justice are 
not easy to definitively identify. Yet the available evidence 
suggests that they are not infrequent. 
C. TRIAL STRUCTURE, PROCESS, AND CONTENT: TILTING THE 
JURY TOWARD DEATH VERDICTS 
The nature and content of the capital trial process contrib-
ute to what has been termed the "moral disengagement" of 
capital jurors.77 Moral disengagement means that the psycho-
logical barriers against taking the life of another are lowered 
by virtue of the practices and procedures that distance deci-
sion-makers from the human consequences of their decision.78 
In a death penalty case, the morally distancing features of the 
process include the structure of the trial and the sequencing of 
the evidence that is presented in the guilt phase of the trial. 
Specifically, there is a virtually exclusive focus on crime-
76 These processes are described at greater length in HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN, 
supra note 11, at Chapter 6, and Johnson & Haney, supra note 66. 
77 I discuss these issues at greater length in Craig Haney, Violence and the Capi-
tal Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 
49 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1997). The term "moral disengagement" is Albert Bandura's. 
See Albert Bandura, Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement, in ORIGINS OF TERRORISM: 
PSYCHOLOGIES, IDEOLOGIES, THEOLOGIES, STATES OF MIND 161 (W. Reich ed., 1989); 
Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought and Action, in HANDBOOK 
OF MORAL BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOPMENT 45 (W. Kurtines & J. Gewirtz eds., 1991). 
78 Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury, supra note 77, at 1449. 
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related evidence and correspondingly minimal attention given 
to the personhood of the accused. This is followed by exclu-
sively crime-related aggravating evidence in the penalty phase. 
Typically, only then is the presentation of contextualizing, so-
cial historical information about the defendant possible. 
This means that evidence and testimony that is likely to 
have a morally disengaging effect on jurors-evidence that en-
courages them to dehumanize the defendant and to distance 
themselves from him as a person--occurs first and cannot be 
effectively addressed or rebutted until the very last stage of the 
trial. We know that dehumanization operates to cognitively 
distance people from the moral implications of their actions.79 
For example, as Tom Tyler has noted, dehumanization "pre-
vents the moral issues which are normally raised when harm is 
being done to other human beings from being raised in a par-
ticular instance."8o Whatever else dehumanization accom-
plishes in this context, it is likely to facilitate death sentencing 
(including imposing death sentences on persons who do not de-
serve to receive). 
Some of the moral disengagement that facilitates death 
sentencing also derives from the formal, legalistic atmosphere 
of the trial itself, and some from legal doctrines that prohibit 
jurors from learning about certain issues that might balance 
the moral equation with which they are presumably working. 
For example, as one legal commentator has noted, "the emo-
tional, physical, and experiential aspects of being human have 
by and large been banished from the better legal neighborhoods 
and from explicit recognition in legal discourse .... "81 Another 
acknowledged that the courtroom setting is "hardly intimate or 
otherwise conducive to 'knowing' someone" and that anyone 
who advocates the empathetic understanding of a defendant in 
a legal proceeding "must favor radical restructuring of court 
79 See, e.g., Bandura, Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement, supra note 77; Ban-
dura, Social Cognitive Thoery of Moral Thought and Action, supra note 77; Albert Ban-
dura, Bill Underwood & Michael Fromson, Disinhibition of Aggression through Diffu-
sion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims, 9 J. OF RESEARCH IN 
PERSONALITY 253 (1975); Philip Zimbardo, The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, 
Order Versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON 
MOTIVATION 237-309 (W. Arnold & D. Levine eds., 1969). 
80 Tom Tyler, The Social Psychology of Authority; Why Do People Obey an Order 
to Harm Others?, 24 LAw & SOC'y REV. 1089, 1093 (1990). 
81 Lynn Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1575 (1987). 
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procedures to make them more congenial" to such things.82 
Although these are normative statements about legal lan-
guage and proceedings in general, they are particularly prob-
lematic-and indeed may be fatal-in a capital case. Because 
jurors have to make a moral assessment of the defendant's 
overall culpability, one that requires them to empathically 
"know" someone (and his or her life history) if they are to truly 
do justice, anything that drives the jury farther away from the 
defendant can lead to a death sentence being wrongly imposed. 
As Samuel Pillsbury has pointed out, "[t]he question of what 
punishment an offender deserves requires a complex factual 
and moral evaluation. . .. [I]f accuracy in desert evaluation is 
paramount, as it is in the capital context, we must adopt a 
broad view of culpability that defies encapsulation in rules."83 
Although, in general terms, "[l]egal decisions and lawmaking 
frequently have nothing to do with understanding human ex-
periences, affect, suffering-how people do live,"84 the law's 
tendency to disengage us from these issues in capital penalty 
trials can have fatal consequences. 
Moreover, there is an asymmetry to the kind of informa-
tion that capital jurors can receive that tends to increase levels 
of moral disengagement. Specifically, the viewing of the defen-
dant's violence, showing the jurors the capital crime in graphic 
and gruesome detail, has become routine in the guilt phase of 
these cases. In addition, the Supreme Court has sanctioned 
the use of so called victim-impact testimony in capital penalty 
trials, authorizing prosecutors to go even farther by presenting 
capital jurors with the full range of terrible consequences that 
the defendant's violence has brought about, regardless of 
whether those consequences were intended or foreseeable. 
They now routinely explore the myriad dimensions of grief and 
loss and longing that the defendant's violence has produced.85 
82 Toni Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, 
Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2108 (1989). 
83 Samuel Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal 
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 669 (1989). 
84 Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1574-1575 
(1987) (emphasis added). 
85 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (authorizing the use of "victim 
impact" testimony in capital penalty trials). The practice remains controversial for a 
variety of reasons, including the fact that it holds persons accountable and morally 
blameworthy for consequences that they did not specifically intend and could not have 
reasonably foreseen. Nonetheless, the use of victim impact testimony in capital cases is 
28
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol37/iss1/6
2006] INJUSTICE IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 159 
However, the law systematically and explicitly prevents capital 
jurors from learning anything comparable about the nature 
and consequences of the state's violence-the execution that 
they are being asked to authorize.86 
Thus, the consequences of the defendant's violence are 
made highly salient, sometimes through the use of narrative 
devices that are so richly, comprehensively, and graphically de-
tailed that they easily become the most compelling, wrenching 
part of the trial. On the other hand, the consequences of the 
violence in which the capital jury is being asked to directly par-
ticipate are minimized, hidden from view, sanitized, or treated 
in a way that implies that other decisionmakers (at later stages 
in the process) will be responsible for bringing them about.87 
Jurors disengaged in these ways from the consequences of the 
death verdicts they are being asked to authorize are more 
likely to render them. They are also more likely to render them 
erroneously (that is, to return death verdicts when, in fact, 
they would have voted for life if they had been better and more 
fully informed). 
Another aspect of the capital trial process also has the po-
tential to increase the number of times a capital defendant is 
wrongfully condemned. In the 1976 decisions in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty, it confidently en-
dorsed a set of statutory reforms that relied heavily on judicial 
instructions to regularize and rationalize the death sentencing 
process.88 The basic notion, as expressed in these early, land-
now widespread. 
86 For example, in one California case the state supreme court ruled unequivo· 
cally that "[e]vidence of how the death penalty will be performed, as well as the nature 
and quality of life for one imprisoned for life without he possibility of parole, is properly 
excluded" from the jury's consideration." People v. Fudge, 7 Cal. 4th 1075, 1117 (1994). 
In this case and others, these assertions come without any underlying analysis or rea· 
soning; they simply are part of a broader rule that the nature of the punishment itself 
is "not relevant to any issue material to the choice of penalty." Id. at 1124. 
87 See, e.g., Joseph Hoffman, Where's the Buck?-·Juror Misperception of Sentenc· 
ing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137 (1995). 
88 A series of state death penalty statutes passed in the aftermath of Furman 
were evaluated in opinions issued simultaneously by the Court in its 1976 Term. The 
lead case, Gregg u. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), approved of Georgia's new death pen· 
alty statute in which a judge or jury was required to find at least one aggravating cir· 
cumstance beyond a reasonable doubt and then to consider other aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances before sentencing a defendant to death. In Proffitt u. Florida, 
428 U.S. 242 (1976), the Court similarly approved the new Florida death penalty stat· 
ute in which, following a jury's "advisory" verdict, a judge was required to weigh aggra· 
vating against mitigating factors to determine whether the death penalty should be 
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mark cases, was that the previously "unbridled" discretion of 
capital jurors could be brought under control by having judges 
provide them with a list of factors or issues that they should 
think about, consider, and use in certain specified ways in 
making the choice between life and death.89 
There is now much reason to believe that the Court's 
"guided discretion" model was advanced with far too much op-
timism, long before its supposed curative effects had been dem-
onstrated. In fact, a number of studies, including ones con-
ducted shortly after the new sentencing models were 
implemented in the mid- to late 1970s, demonstrated that 
many of the very same problems that plagued the earlier "arbi-
trary and capricious" and potentially discriminatory system 
remained.90 Among other things, these standard penalty phase 
instructions are so difficult for average people to understand 
and apply that many jurors simply are unable to comprehend 
their most basic features. This instructional confusion begins 
with the concepts of aggravation and, especially, mitigation, 
and extends to uncertainty about which of the specific factors 
should tip the scales in the direction life or death. The errors 
are fundamental, they are made frequently, and there is no 
evidence that they are corrected in the course of jury delibera-
tion. As a result, there is no assurance that the death sentenc-
ing process that is supposed to be governed by this process re-
sults in fair, accurate, and reliable verdicts. 
Moreover, there is a significant one-sidedness to the jurors' 
confusion. On the one hand, the kind of evidence that typically 
imposed. The Court approved a very different kind of death penalty statute in Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), examining the new Texas death penalty statute that re-
quired capital jurors to answer three questions affirmatively before sentencing him to 
death: first, whether the defendant's homicidal act was intentional; second, whether it 
was not a reasonable response to provocation; and third, whether there was a probabil-
ity that the defendant would commit future acts of violence constituting a continuing 
threat to society. 
89 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-95; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 249-51; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 
274-77. 
90 See, e.g., David C. Baldus et aI., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A 
LEGAL EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (Northeastern University Press 1990); William J. Bowers 
& Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Stat-
utes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980); Sheldon Ekland-Olson, Structured Discretion, 
Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty: The First Decade After Furman in Texas, 69 SOC. 
SCI. Q. 853 (1988); Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The 
Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
754 (1983); Hans Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The 
Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1981). 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol37/iss1/6
2006] INJUSTICE IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 161 
makes up the bulk of a case in aggravation (the facts of the 
crime, prior criminal acts, victim accounts of pain and loss) are 
things that tend to be socially agreed upon as increasing the 
severity of whatever punishment is deserved. They make 
death verdicts more likely and are not only socially agreed 
upon but the better understood of the two key terms in the in-
struction. On the other hand, the kind of evidence that makes 
up the typical case in mitigation is significantly undermined by 
the jurors' inability to understand the concept itself. Every 
study on the topic confirms that it is poorly comprehended by a 
significant number of participants, including potential and ac-
tual jurors. In addition, even when jurors do understand the 
concept in the abstract, they tend to associate it with crime-
related factors that rarely are presented by the defense in a 
capital penalty phase.91 Jurors who can understand and apply 
aggravation, but who do not understand and cannot apply 
mitigation are likely to wrongly condemn a capital defendant 
out of sheer ignorance and confusion, rather than any careful 
and reliable "moral inquiry into the culpability of the defen-
dant."92 
In addition, by couching the jury's life-and-death decision 
in terms that imply that some kind of legal formula is driving 
the sentencing verdict, the instructions may remove or under-
mine the jurors' collective and individual sense of moral re-
sponsibility. Thus, at this very final stage,the process leaves 
some jurors with a feeling that they are being compelled to 
reach a death verdict that does not reflect their personal views. 
By disengaging critical ethical concerns and deep moral consid-
erations in this way, fo~mulaic death sentencing and instruc-
tions that appear to allow or even encourage jurors to relin-
quish personal responsibility may also contribute to wrongful 
condemnations. 
D. LETHAL LAWYERING: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AND THE 
ATTRIBUTION OF MORAL GUILT 
There is one final way in which the nature of the capital 
trial may contribute to the dehumanization of the defendant, 
91 See, e.g., James Luginbuhl, Comprehension of Judges' Instructions in the Pen-
alty Phase of a Capital Trial: Focus on Mitigating Circumstances, 16 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 203 (1992). 
92 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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morally disengage jurors from the decision before them, and 
lead them to wrongfully condemn someone to die. A capital 
penalty phase presents defense attorneys with a special chal-
lenge-to explain their client's life course and contextualize his 
behavior in terms of his social history and present circum-
stances. Defense attorneys are unlikely to have encountered 
such a challenge in any other kind of case. Yet, it they fail to 
effectively meet it, there is a high probability that the jury that 
sits in final judgment of their client will be denied the essential 
information needed to render a fair and reliable sentence. 
The challenge itself is rooted in deep-seated psychological 
tendencies. Social psychologists have written extensively about 
the way observers attribute the causes of behavior to the inter-
nal states and traits of the persons who perform it, even when 
other, more external causes may be responsible.93 This com-
mon tendency is termed the "fundamental attribution error." 
In a legal context, of course, it may lead jurors to attribute in-
tentionality and blameworthy states of mind to a criminal de-
fendant, even when situational forces have contributed to, and 
help to account for, the criminal act that they are called upon 
to judge.94 This may contribute to one kind of miscarriage of 
justice that I described earlier, wherein jurors attribute more 
culpable states of mind to criminal defendants than the evi-
dence in their case otherwise warrants.95 
Although the tendency to commit the fundamental attribu-
tion error is widespread and may occur whenever observers 
make judgments about the actions of others, certain factors 
make this erroneous allocation of legal responsibility more 
likely. For example, all other things being equal, the greater 
the harm that the particular behavior brings about, the more 
likely that it will be attributed to internal causes (i.e., to the 
93 See Lee Hamilton, Intuitive Psychologist or Intuitive Lawyer? Alternative Mod-
els of the Attribution Process, 39 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 767 (1980); 
Joel Johnson et aI., Causal Attribution and Dispositional Inference: Evidence of Incon-
sistent Judgments, 20 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 567 (1984); LEE ROSS & 
RICHARD NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (McGraw-Hill 1991). 
94 See, e.g., Eric Hansen, Charles Kimble, & David Biers, Actors and Observers: 
Divergent Attributions of Constrained Unfriendly Behavior, 29 SOC. BEHAV. & 
PERSONALITY 87 (2001); Martin Safer, Attributing Evil to the Subject, Not the Situa-
tion, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 205 (1980). 
95 See supra notes 33·60 and accompanying text. 
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perpetrator of the act).96 In addition, the less similar the per-
son whose behavior is being judged to the person making the 
judgment, the greater the tendency to perceive internal causes 
for the behavior, to hold the actor more responsible and culpa-
ble for his actions, and to punish him more harshly. 97 
When the defendant is a minority group member, it may 
give rise to what has been termed the "ultimate attribution er-
ror", which in this context entails using racial differences as 
the basis for assigning additional blame and meting out 
harsher punishment. 98 In addition, stereotyped media mes-
sages about the "kind of people" who are likely to commit crime 
also may increase the amount of responsibility and blame that 
jurors will allocate to perpetrators.99 This may change the na-
ture of the moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant 
in which a capital jury is supposed to engage, skew its view of 
him, change jurors' assessment of his death worthiness, and 
lower the threshold for imposing a death sentence. 
To effectively rebut these tendencies in a case in mitiga-
tion, defense attorneys must humanize the defendant by con-
textualizing his behavior. That is, they should assist jurors in 
overcoming their pre-existing stereotypes and expectations 
about the internal and individualistic nature of violence. These 
are precisely the stereotypes that are created and amplified by 
the media coverage of death penalty cases and the various as-
pects of the capital trial process that I have referred to 
above. loo 
Yet, experienced capitallitigators and death penalty schol-
ars have repeatedly warned that too many defense attorneys 
lack the kind of training and professional experience that is 
needed to find and develop this humanizing testimony.1Ol In 
addition, many of them are denied the time and resources it 
96 See, e.g., Chimaeze Ugwuegbu & Clyde Hendrick, Personal Causality and At-
tribution of Responsibility, 2 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 76 (1974). 
97 See, e.g. Curtis Banks, The Effects of Perceived Similarity Upon the Use of Re-
ward and Punishment, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 131 (1976). 
98 See, e.g., Thomas Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending All-
port's Cognitive Analysis' of Prejudice, in INTERGROUP RELATIONS: ESSENTIAL 
READINGS. KEy READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 162-173 (Michael Hogg & Dominic 
Abrams eds., 2001). 
99 See Haney & Greene, supra note 53. 
100 See supra notes 33-92 and accompanying text. 
101 Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst 
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835, 1851 (1994). 
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would take to accomplish these tasks properly.lo2 As a result, 
too little of this testimony is effectively gathered, prepared, or 
presented in many penalty phase cases.l°3 As one capital liti-
gator summarized: 
In the sentencing phase of these proceedings, defendants of-
ten find themselves represented by lawyers who have no ex-
perience in or knowledge about developing evidence of men-
tal illness or other mitigating factors. In case after case, the 
jury never hears that the defendant had an honorable mili-
tary record and then developed post-traumatic stress disor-
der, or that the defendant had serious mental illness when 
growing up but was never treated.104 
Indeed, two legal commentators concluded that "it is com-
monplace in many states for trial counsel to fail to present any 
evidence or argument at all during the punishment phase of a 
capital trial."105 
In addition, defense attorneys in many jurisdictions are 
overmatched and outspent by experienced prosecutors who 
have the state's considerable resources at their disposal.1°6 
This disparity in resources increases the likelihood that wrong-
ful condemnations will occur in death penalty cases. The dis-
parity in resources amplifies a pre-existing advantage-the fact 
that the prosecution's implicit and over arching theory in the 
typical capital trial generally comports with stereotypic beliefs 
102 Id. at 1854. 
103 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Death By Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitu-
tional Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defen-
dants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679, 680 (1990); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The 
Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835 
(1994); Stephen B. Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of 
Poor, Minority and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57 MO. L. REV. 
849 (1992); Richard H. Burr, Representing the Client on Death Row: The Politics of Ad-
vocacy, 59 UMKC. L. Rev. 1(1990); William Geimer, Law and Reality in the Capital 
Penalty Trial, 18 N. Y. U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 273 (1991); Gary Goodpaster, The 
Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L. 
REV. 299 (1983); Ronald Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious 
Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980's, 14 N. Y. U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 797 
(1986). 
104 Ronald Tabak, The Egregiously Unfair Implementation of Capital Punishment 
in the United States, supra note 20, at 18. 
105 Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two 
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REV. 355, 
421 (1995) (emphasis added). 
106 Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 101, at 1849. 
34
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol37/iss1/6
2006] INJUSTICE IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 165 
about crime and punishment held by citizens and jurors. That 
is, the notion that the defendant's crime stems entirely from 
his evil makeup, and that he therefore deserves to be judged 
and punished exclusively on the basis of his presumably free, 
morally blameworthy choices, is rooted in a longstanding cul-
tural ethos. 107 As I have noted, the media has conditioned 
many capital jurors to grant it uncritical and unquestioned ac-
ceptance. By providing causal explanations for the behavior of 
others in largely dispositional or personal (as opposed to situ-
ational or contextual) terms, this ethos meshes perfectly with 
the well-documented fundamental attribution error described 
above. IDS 
From a social psychological perspective, then, the defense 
penalty phase presentation must somehow induce jurors to 
temporarily suspend belief in a cultural ethos that many of 
them regard as commonsense, and to correct the fundamental 
attribution error by educating them about the historical, con-
textual, and situational determinants of the defendant's behav-
ior. The prosecution's approach, on the other hand, is to em-
brace and build upon the jurors' pre-existing tendencies. As a 
result, the average juror's intuitive understanding of behavior 
is highly compatible with the basic terms of the typical prose-
cutorial narrative. 
This means that defense attorneys have a much greater 
educational burden to meet in capital penalty trials. They 
must, in essence, overcome what many jurors already regard as 
commonsense. When attorneys lack the significant training 
and resources needed to properly find, assemble, and present 
the available mitigation, they are unlikely to meet this burden. 
As a result, many capital defendants will have their lives ended 
by juries that were never given a chance to truly understand 
them. Juries may remain morally disengaged when trial attor-
neys are unable-for lack of skill, effort, or resources-to· pre-
sent humanizing, mitigating explanations for their client's be-
havior. 
Among other things, then, the sheer legal and psychologi-
cal complexity of capital cases, including the significant added 
107 See, e.g., Craig Haney, Criminal Justice and the Nineteenth-Century Para· 
digm: The Triumph of Psychological Individualism in the "Formative Era," 6 LAw & 
HUM. BEHAV. 191 (1982). 
108 See Luginbuhl, supra note 91, and the articles cited therein. 
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burden of having to conduct an elaborate penalty trial and the 
need to overcome the widespread but erroneous tendencies I 
have discussed, greatly increase the demands that are placed 
on defense attorneys. In this sense, the deficiencies in lawyer-
ing that plague capital representation generally and contribute 
to wrongful convictions are even more likely to jeopardize the 
outcome of capital penalty phases. These deficiencies contrib-
ute directly to death sentences being imposed in cases where, 
had the trial attorney handled the penalty trial properly, a life 
sentence would have resulted. As the authors of the American 
Bar Association's proposal to critically examine the administra-
tion of the death penalty put it, "[i]t is scarcely surprising that 
the results of poor lawyering are often literally fatal to capital 
defendants."lo9 
Finally, there is no reason to assume that the wrongful 
condemnations that come about as a result of the various pre-
trial and trial-related problems I have described will necessar-
ily be corrected in later stages of the case. Indeed, the poor 
quality of legal representation at the trial level is replicated 
and exacerbated in many states after a defendant is sentenced 
to death. These post-conviction appeals are critically impor-
tant because they are the only real opportunity to determine 
whether mistakes or omissions may have contributed to the 
outcome of the case. One experienced attorney described the 
situation that still prevails in some parts of the country where 
"states allow only a token fee of a few thousand dollars, or cap 
expenses at about the same amount, or have no standards for 
lawyer competence, or inflict all three plagues on the con-
demned. These states in fact deny any meaningful representa-
tion to men and women on death row."110 
III. BEYOND FACTUAL INNOCENCE: ADDRESSING WRONGFUL 
CONDEMNATIONS 
Largely in response to the highly publicized exonerations 
of many death-sentenced persons over the last several decades, 
and the realization that there were many factually innocent 
109 American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, 
Death Without Justice: A Guide for Examining the Administration of the Death Penalty 
in the United States, 63 OHIO ST. L. J. 487, 541 (2002). 
lIO Elisabeth Semel, Representing Death Row Inmates at the Outskirts of the 
Southern Front, 26 CACJ Forum 37, 40 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
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persons who not only were convicted of serious crimes but also, 
in the most extreme cases, were sentenced to die for them, a 
number of commissions, organizations, and individuals prom-
ulgated guidelines and recommendations intended to achieve 
the fair administration of the death penalty.111 These propos-
als are intelligent and important, and they go a long way to-
ward insuring that many aspects of the system of death sen-
tencing in the United States will be improved, becoming fairer 
and more reliable. However, in part because these recommen-
dations were prompted by wrongful convictions, most of them 
are designed to improve what I have termed factual guilt de-
terminations. In this section I discuss some of the reforms that 
would need to be introduced to reduce or eliminate wrongful 
condemnations. 
Although it is difficult to provide reliable estimates of the 
number of wrongful condemnations, there is reason to believe 
that they are widespread, especially in .comparison to wrongful 
convictions. For example, in describing the broken system of 
capital punishment in the United States, James Liebman arid 
his colleagues have shown that for every hundred death sen-
tences meted out over a twenty-year period, some sixty-eight of 
them were overturned because of "serious legal errors."112 On 
retrial, eighty-two percent of those defendants were found not 
to have deserved the death penalty and seven percent were 
found to be not guilty of the offense for which they had been 
convicted.113 Using this ration as a very rough estimate would 
suggest that for every exoneration of a factually not guilty per-
son, there may be more than ten times as many whose moral 
guilt was erroneously assessed (that is, who were initially 
wrongfully condemned). 
I have discussed many of the standard policies and prac-
tices that operate in our system of capital punishment to mor-
ally distance citizens, voters, and jurors from the otherwise im-
111 See, e.g., Massachusetts Governor's Council on Capital Punishment, Final Re-
port (2004), available at http://www.mass.gov/Agov2/docs/5-3-
04%20MassDPReportFinaI.pdf (last visited Aug. 1,2006); Judge Leonard Sand & Dan-
ielle Rose, Proof Beyond All Possible Doubt: L~ There a Need for a Higher Burden of 
Proof When the Sentence May Be Death? 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 135.9 (2003); J. Wilgoren, 
fllinois Panel: Death Sentence Needs Overhaul, N. Y. TIMES, April 15, 2001, at AI, A19. 
112 James Liebman et aI., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases. 1973-
1995,78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1852 (2000). 
113Id. 
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possibly difficult psychological challenges with which death 
sentencing presents them. Of course, as the process of death 
sentencing unfolds in any given case, it is experienced by deci-
sion-makers as the sum of all of its interlocking parts, and 
those parts operate in tandem to help facilitate the actual im-
position of the death penalty. It is my belief that in reality the 
death penalty functions as a complex social psychological net-
work that creates a special set of reactions in those persons 
who are exposed to and influenced by it. Those reactions are 
what make the operation of the system possible and, in the fi-
nal analysis, facilitate the imposition of the death penalty. For 
this reason, systemic reforms are necessary to significantly im-
prove the way the death penalty is implemented in the United 
States. An overall revamping of this system is the only way to 
make it truly fair, and to insure that wrongful condemnations 
are rare or non-existent. 
Thus, many aspects of the current system require funda-
mental change. For example, as I have noted, many citizens, 
voters, and capital jurors rely primarily on the media for the 
information about crime and punishment. 1l4 As a result, they 
are mis-educated by what they see and hear. Thus, the media's 
tendency to locate the causes of violent crime exclusively 
within those persons who perpetrate it reinforces and exacer-
bates fundamental attribution error .. In addition, the risk of 
victimization is exaggerated and the social contextual roots of 
criminality typically ignored. As a result, exposure to the indi-
vidualizing and sensationalized images of criminality that the 
media typically project serves to heighten the audience's fear 
not only of crime but also of the persons who commit it. In 
general, this helps to shape the public's perspective on the need 
for harsh punishment, including capital punishment. 
The challenge of correcting media-related biases is a 
daunting one. In addition to educational efforts aimed at mak-
ing citizens more critical consumers of media messages, the 
media can be encouraged and lobbied to rely on a broader 
range of sources in their death penalty reporting. Law profes-
sor Susan Bandes observed that it also would require reporters 
and news commentators to appreciate the fact that a particular 
capital defendant "may have committed a crime worthy of pun-
ishment, but not of a death sentence," something she concedes 
114 See supra notes 37-60 and accompanying text. 
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is presently "too nuanced to fit any recognizable dramatic cate-
gory."115 
On the other hand, although I have been highly critical of 
the media, I also believe the media could become a part of the 
solution for at least some of these problems. As one capital 
litigator observed: 
[It] takes the press to reach the public. If you can get the 
press interested, you reach the court of public opinion. For 
the many languishing on death row, whose trials did not at-
tract press, appeal to that court is foreclosed. The miscar-
riage of justice in those cases, owing so often to inadequate 
assistance of counsel, does not come to public notice. The re-
sources at the command of the press for investigation of the 
facts are not available to the accused .... 116 
In addition, a more concerted effort would need to be made 
to directly correct the collective media myths and store of mis-
information that currently distorts the public's understanding 
of capital punishment. James Coleman, head of an American 
Bar Association committee that examined the fairness of capi-
tal punishment in the United States, reminded his colleagues, 
"[a]s lawyers, public officials, and citizens, we have a responsi-
bility to educate ourselves and to educate the public about the 
administration of the death penalty and to take whatever ac-
tions each of us as individuals and all of us collectively can take 
to make capital punishment and how it is administered fair 
and unbiased."l17 
Beyond public education, there are a variety of legal re-
forms that would be needed to significantly reduce or eliminate 
wrongful condemnations in capital cases. For example, be-
cause of what research tells us about the way that exposure to 
extensive pretrial publicity can prejudice the jury pool, the 
change of venue criteria that judges currently apply in many 
capital cases would need to be liberalized. That is, capital 
cases especially should not go to trial in jurisdictions where 
prospective jurors have been saturated with prejudicial public-
115 Susan Bandes, Fear Factor: The Role of Media in Covering and Shaping the 
Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585, 588 (2004). 
116 Eleanor Jackson Piel, The Death Row Brothers, 147 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. 
PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 30, 36 (2003). 
117 James Coleman, Call to Action: A Moratorium on Executions, 4 N.Y. CITY L. 
REV. 117, 147-48 (2002). 
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ity and as a result may hold beliefs and have formed conclu-
sions that will compromise their ability to fairly decide the 
case. Indeed, a rebuttable legal presumption might be created 
in favor of a change of venue in capital cases that have gener-
ated a certain significant quantity of publicity, or for those in 
which properly conducted, reliable community surveys empiri-
cally document that specified high levels of pretrial case 
awareness and prejudgment exist. 
It is also worth recognizing the important role that effec-
tive jury selection can play in enhancing the fairness of certain 
capital trials. However, to achieve this goal, courts would need 
to insure that high quality, expansive voir dire is permitted 
and practiced in capital cases, so that potentially prejudiced ju-
rors can be ferreted out. In addition to making capital voir dire 
more effective by expanding its scope, its problematic features 
would need to be addressed and eliminated. This will not be 
easy. Specifically, because the negative effects of death qualifi-
cation flow from its structurally anomalous position in the jury 
selection process, they can be effectively addressed only by 
somehow eliminating the death qualification of the guilt phase 
jury. This would require a separate jury to be death qualified 
(or the guilt-phase jury to be subsequently death qualified) and 
empowered to proceed with sentencing if and only if the defen-
dant is convicted of a death-eligible crime. lls 
At the very least, more attention needs to be paid in jury 
selection to the issue of mitigation so that prospective jurors 
are questioned about whether and how they would give par-
ticular kinds of mitigating evidence life-giving effect. As John 
Blume and his colleagues have noted, it means that "voir dire 
should ensure that the venire members seated on the jury are 
empowered to react to mitigating evidence in accordance with 
the dictates of their conscience, even in the face of adverse re-
actions from other jurors."119 However, in order to get to this 
118 That is, the procedure might entail the subsequent death qualification of the 
original guilt· phase jury (augmented by additional alternate jurors, selected at the 
time that the guilt-phase jury is impaneled and substituted as needed for original ju-
rors who are not death qualified). Or, it might entail a process of bifurcation in which 
a completely separate penalty-phase jury is impaneled. This second jury might be se-
lected and seated at the outset of the guilt-phase trial, and assume full responsibilities 
only after a penalty trial became necessary. Alternatively, such a second jury might be 
selected and impaneled from a new pool of prospective jurors drawn if and when the 
defendant was convicted. 
119 John H. Blume et aI., Probing "Life Qualification" Through Expanded Voir 
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point, prospective jurors would need to receive an accurate ex-
planation of mitigation and attorneys would need to be given 
an opportunity to question veniremen to determine whether 
they are willing to at least consider mitigation in their penalty-
phase decision-making. 
With respect to the capital trial process itself, the virtually 
exclusive focus on crime-related evidence and correspondingly 
minimal attention given to the personhood of the defendant in 
the guilt phase of the trial has a morally distancing effect on 
the jurors. This is exacerbated in the penalty phase of the trial 
by the initial, exclusive focus on crime-related evidence. Only 
then is the presentation of contextualizing, social historical in-
formation about the defendant possible. Capital trial proce-
dures might address these order effects by broadening the 
scope of permissible guilt-phase testimony (for example, by al-
lowing the defense to introduce evidence that humanizes the 
defendant and contextualizes his actions). Consideration 
might also be given to allowing the defense the option of both 
opening and closing the penalty trial. 
With respect to the all-important penalty phase instruc-
tions, a strong argument can be made in favor of revising them 
in ways that will make them comprehensible. In addition, 
courts that are serious about increasing the reliability and 
fairness of capital jury decision-making will need to consider 
making sure not only that the instructions are adequately un-
derstood by jurors but also that they are not laboring under 
any of the widespread misconceptions that are both likely to be 
held by the typical capital juror and introduce error into the 
death-sentencing process.l20 
Recently conducted research shows that it is possible to 
correct and improve some of the most problematic features of 
the capital jury sentencing instructions. Thus, a relatively 
straightforward modification in the standard California pen-
alty phase instruction that relied on linguistic principles to 
simplify some of the most cumbersome and confusing language, 
and the inclusion of pinpoint instructions that provided case-
Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209, 1215 (2001). 
120 See Anthony Paduano & Clive Stafford· Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misper-
ceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 211, 214·230 (1987); Benjamin Steiner, William Bowers & Austin Sarat, 
Folk Knowledge as Legal Action: Death Penalty Judgments and the Tenet of Early Re-
lease in a Culture of Mistrust and Punitiveness, 33 LAw & SOC'y REV. 461, 499 (1999). 
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related examples of key terms (i.e., specific pieces of evidence 
that were either aggravating or mitigating) both significantly 
improved participants' understanding of the concepts of aggra-
vation and mitigation.121 Although this study represents only 
an initial step in answering this important question, these en-
couraging results suggest that there are ways to improve in-
structional comprehension and increase reliability of the capi-
tal jury decision-making process. 
Finally, many wrongful condemnations have likely come 
about because the law has not required attorneys to perform ef-
fectively in the penalty phase of capital cases by humanizing 
their clients and contextualizing their lives in ways that would 
allow jurors to better understand them and to weigh the full 
range issues that are supposed to guide their decision-making 
at this stage. In too many cases where attorneys have failed to 
do this, jurors must render verdicts on the basis of knowledge 
and information that is inadequate, skewed, or just plain 
wrong. 
Of course, no amount of legal reform, including specific 
proposals made in the preceding pages, can succeed without 
the presence of competent lawyers who have the resources, 
skill, and opportunity to take proper advantage of it. Despite 
recently promulgated guidelines indicating that attorneys 
should have extensive experience and training before they rep-
resent a death penalty defendant, under-funded, under-
trained, and inexperienced attorneys continue to handle capital 
cases.122 For example, the ABA standards that govern the ap-
pointment, training, and monitoring of defense counsel in capi-
tal cases establish an attainable model for the proper represen-
tation of a capital client. 123 Despite their reasonableness and 
the imprimatur of the ABA, no state currently requires that 
these standards be adhered to.124 
121 Amy Smith & Craig Haney, Get to the Point: The Use of Pinpoint Instructions 
to Improve Juror Instructional Comprehension in Capital Penalty Trials (2004) (unpub· 
lished manuscript, on file with author). 
122 See, e.g., Stephen Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10l. 
123 See American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Perform· 
ance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003). 
124 For example, Elisabeth Semel, then Director of the ABA's Capital Representa· 
tion Project, speaking about states in the Southern "death belt" of the United States, 
observed that, even if the states had adopted standards for the appointment of counsel, 
"they most certainly are not the minimum standards the ABA put into place over 
eleven years ago. Indeed, because of the refusal to adequately fund counsel, the stan-
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The failure to follow these minimal standards is likely to 
continue to produce miscarriages of justice at the penalty phase 
stages of capital cases, resulting in wrongful condemnations 
that would have resulted in life sentences had competent coun-
sel handled them. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Michael McCann, the elected District Attorney for Mil-
waukee County, Wisconsin, was no doubt correct when he as-
serted that our nation's criminal justice system is plagued by 
an "epidemic of wrongful convictions," brought about by an 
"epidemic of errors" that undermine the fairness and reliability 
of the process by which factual guilt is assigned.l25 But the 
same error-plagued system that produces wrongful convictions 
is responsible for deciding on legal and moral guilt in capital 
cases. As I have suggested in the preceding pages, there is 
much reason to believe that it accomplishes these tasks with 
even less fairness and reliability. To be sure, the decision of 
whether a defendant "deserves" the death penalty presents pro-
foundly complex legal and moral issues. Even in an ideal sys-
tem, attorneys, judges, and jurors would be forced to grapple 
with a host of deep and difficult psychological, intellectual, and 
even spiritual questions. By confusing these issues and cloud-
ing these questions, our system of death sentencing helps to in-
sure that there are too many capital defendants who, even 
though they may be factually guilty, are wrongfully con-
demned. 
dards are honored, if at all, in the breach." Elisabeth Semel, Call to Action: A Morato· 
rium on Executions, 4 N. Y. CITY L. REV. 117, 137 (2002). 
125 Michael McCann, Call to Action: A Moratorium on Executions, 4 N. Y. CITY L. 
REV. 117, 165 (2002). 
43
Haney: Injustice in Death Penalty Cases
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006
